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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved
by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members
are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the
National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The
members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for
their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
The National Research Council was established by the National
Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science
and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and
of advising the federal government. The Council operates in accordance
with general policies determined by the Academy under the authority of
its congressional charter of 1863, which establishes the Academy as a
private, nun,)rofit, self-governing membership corporation. The Council
has become the prirr_cipal operating agency of both the National Academy
of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in the conduct of
their services to the government, the public, and the scientific and
engineering communities. It is administered jointly by both Academies
and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Engineering
and the Institute of Medicine were established in 1964 and 1970,
respectively, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences.
This report and the study on which it is based were supported by
Contract No. NASW-4003 between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the National Academy of Sciences.
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2011 Crystal Drive, Suite 605, Arlington, Virginia 22202
may 15, 1985
Dr. Joseph F. Shea
Chairman, Space Station Engineering
and Technology Development Committee
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20418
Dear Dr. Shea:
Enclosed is the report of the recent meeting in Huntsville on .space
station maintainability. Bernie Meggin and I met with Phil Culbertson,
y	 members of his space station staff, and representatives from the Office of
Aeronautics and Space Technology and reviewed the results of the meeting.
The major purpose of the meeting was, of course, to provide a forum
where representation from NASA and industry could exchange experiences and
views on how the maintainability goals of NASA might be achieved with
acceptable cost. Representatives from a number of non-aerospace organiza-
tions discussed their experience in dealing with the complex interaction of
reliability, maintainability, logistics, transportation, and costs. The
discussionfi emphasized the need for systems level guidance early in the
design and development phase.
Everyone recognizes that NASA is still formulating many of the major
system level strategies for the space station. The panel did feel, however,
that given the particular NASA program management structure, it is important
that system level concepts for maintainability be provided to the Level C
centers and the Phase B contractors in time to affect the studies under way
and to provide a common base for the preliminary design effort in the
latter part of Phase B. Phil Culbertson and the other NASA representatives
appreciated and understood this concern.
It was noted at the WASA review that the panel could meet again for a
more definitive review of the evolving maintainability program, if NASA so
desired.
Sincerely,
[CC Lawrence R. Greenwood
Chairman, Panel on
Maintainability
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Preface
In 1984, at the request of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
(ASEB) undertook a study of NASA's space station program. The results
of this study by the ad hoc committee of the ASEB on Space Station
Engineering and Technology Development were published this year. NASA
found the stud y useful and asked the ASEB to continue examination of
the evolving space station program through a series of more specific
studies;
• maintainability
• research and technology in space
• solar thermodynamics research and technology
• program performance
• onboard command and control
• research and technology road maps
The purpose of this examination of maintainability, the first of the
series, is to provide comments on approaches to long-term, reliable
operation at low cost in terms of funds and crew time.
The panel consisted of selected members of the committee and
representatives from industry with special knowledge and experience in
the science, art, and engineering pertinent to maintainability. The
panel was briefed by NASA staff members involved in the development of
the space station maintainability program and on questions and isscles
to be resolved. The panel, in roundtable fashion, discussed these
matters. The deliberations of the panel, following active dialogue
with the NASA representatives, are presented without attribution in
this report of the proceedings.
These proceedings contain a brief synopsis of NASA's presentations,
including questions and issues; notes on the roundtable discussion;
and a summary of the panel's observations for NASA's consideration in
the development of its maintainability program for the apace station.
A set of the NASA presentations is appended for completeness.
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The panel was aware of the fact that NASA was in the process of
negotiating with industry for selection of Phase B space station
concept definition and preliminary design contractors. It was aware
that NASA has not had an opportunity to develop its position on
maintainability much beyond that reflected in the Phase B requests for
proposals. In addition, the panel was aware that the program team
responsible for maintainability was being established and staffed at
the time of this review.
The briefings and discussions were open and candid. The panel
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participants, and NASA attendees for their spirited and constructive
discussion.
The panel recognizes that it is too early to formulate a firm
position on space station maintainability. However, the panel
believes and NASA program management has confirmed that this
interchange was timely and useful in providing a preliminary
assessment of and comments on NASA ' s approach to maintainability.
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Introduction
BACKGROUND
In 1984 the ad hoc committee on Space Station Engineering and
Technology Development of the Aeronautica and Space Engineering Board
(ASEB) conducted a review of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration ' s (NASA's) space station program planning. The review
addressed the initial operating configuration ( IOC) of the station.
The results of the commit" ,LA's study, released in February 1985, were
factored into the development of NASA's space station program and its
request for Phase B ( concept and preliminary design) proposals issued
to industry in September 1984 and awarded this past April.
NASA found the work of the ad hoc committee very useful and asked
the ASEB to reconstitute the ad hoc committee to address:
• onboard maintainability and repair
• in-space research and technology program and facility plans
• solar thermodynamic research and technology development program
planning
• program performance ( cost estimating, management, and cost
avoidance)
• onboard versus ground-based mission control
• technology development road maps from IOC to the growth station
The objective of the committee ' s new assignment is to provide NASA
with advice on ways and means for improving the content, performance,
or effectiveness of these elements of the apace station program.
In response, the ad hoc committee established individual panels to
address each subject. The participants of the panels were to come
from the committee, industry, and universities and thus provide each
panel with individuals experienced in the area of special interest.
It was decided that the subjects of maintainability, program
performance, and onboard mission control would be addressed in round-
table forums focusing on concepts, system design, and organization.
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This tack was taken in view of NASA's interest in program definition
and development and not in program critique at this time.
It war, decided that the subjects of research and technology in
space, solar thermodynamic research and technology development, and
technology development road maps would be addressed in workshops that
focus on NASA program activity and plans.
.ry
	
	
It was also decided that the deliberations of the,,  panels would be
reported as proceedings to expedite the documentation and dissemination
of the information.
THE MAINTAINABILITY PANEL
The task statement setting up the maintainability roundtable noted:
NASA background material will cover such matters as
design philosophy for the initial and growth station;
specifications; and station operations and services,
covering the range of essential to nonessential functions.
questions and issues of particular concern and subjects
that NASA would like the pr ,nel to address will also be
identified.
Of particular interest to NASA are approaches to
providing high reliability and long life at low initial
and operational costs and preservation of crew time for
mission work. Pertinent are views on design. philosophy
and specifications and the related technology developments
that will make the achievement that enhances the
probability of success possible. Pertinent technology
includes redundancy and failure mode design and
diagnostics, artificial intelligence, and automated
repair /replacement.
The proceedings reported here cover the Maintainability Panel's
meeting at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center on March 20-21, 1985.
The list of panel members, participants, and NASA representatives is
presented on page iv. The meeting agenda is presented in Appendix A.
The panel was briefed by NASA representatives; panel participants
discussed their views on maintainability; the panel engaged in general
discussion; and then the panel organized into two subgroups. One
subgroup addressed maintenance concepts; the other, maintenance
technology; and each considered related NASA questions and issues.
The subgroup comments were reviewed with the full panel. This
proceedings report presents the results of this process. The panel's
observations and comment' s are noted without attribution.
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NASA Briefings
The brie!ang graphics of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) representatives are presented in Appendix B.
The following paragraphs summarize this material and include the
questions an,d issues identified by the presentors. Where pertinent,
related panel comments are included.
Richard Carlisle, NASA Headquarters--Opening Comments. The panel was
reminded that the roundtable was intended to be a forum for the
exchange of ideas. NASA hopes to gain from participants' experience
and use the information for structuring space station maintainabllity
guidelines. Carlisle noted that the space station is different from
ear?_o manned space systems in that it will have a long, indefinite
1af_	 the design must allow the crew to use most of its time for
m ILasion support. Because past NASA programs have had little need for
attention to onboard maintainability, NASA has not had to give this
matter much attention.
Bryant Cramer, NASA Headquarters--Elements of Maintainability and Key
Questions. The objective of the discussion is to develop an under-
standing of an optimal approach to space station maintainability. The
subsystems must have a capability for essentially indefinite life
through maintenance, exchange, and/or upgrading. The associated Work
load must not affect crew produc.ivity or safety. A possible goal
might be no more than 3 hours per day per crew member for a 5-day week.
Maintenance has engineering, assurance, and operational aspects and
attributes related to avoiding and facilitating maintenance.
3
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questions related to maintainability reviewed at the meeting and
contained in an earlier statement by Dr. Cramer ,* in summary, are:
• Maintainability requirements?
• Process for identifying requirements? Modcling?
• Driver issues in formulation of plan?
• Approach to conducting system engineering trade studies?
• Approach to implementation?
• Trades between reliability and maintainability? Use of automation?
• Are maintenance goals identified /assigned to each subsystem?
• Balance between mean time before failure versus ease of maintenance
as related to mean time to replacement?
• Process to determine orbital replaceable unit (ORU) support level?
• Determination of auton.. . tion level for high maintainability?
• Application of human factors engineering?
• Role of computer modeling?
• Preservation of maintainability objectives in view of limited
resources?
• Maintainability buildup from the initial operating configuration
(10C), scarring?
• Checking for achievement of maintainability objectives before
flight?
Richard Storm, NASA Headquarters---planning Guidelines. The program is
being approached through dedicated study using the NASA centers and
study contractors. Development should start in 1987 with the IOC in
place in the early 1990s, The U.S. cost through IOC is $8 billion.
The station will he built and sustained through the use of the
Shuttle providing long-term, continuous service with men. The station
will have both manned and unmanned elements, be evolutionary, and
maintainable.
The reliability /maintainability issues are:
• maintenance demand versus crew time
• program priority versus crew time
• reliability boundary--the most reliable versus lowest acceptable
• life cycle coat alternatives
• internal access versus external access
• software ( repair and maintenance)
• spares availability
• ORUs stored on board versus on ground
• safety /safe mode operations
• sustaining support
• analytical methodology controversial —lacks credibility
*Dr. Cramer had prepared a statement on maintainability philosophy and
issues for the panel prior to the panel meeting. Extracts from this
statement are appended to his presentation material.
sThe approach to resolving such issues encompass actions that result
in: fail-safe, restorable design; building "best" state-of-art hard-
''	 ware; and designing for accessibility/modularity and replaceability.
Trade studies should address ORU levels and space requirements.
Studies should also address anticipated maintenance and service
requirements.
It will be assumed that the resupply cycle is 90 days, that design
=;;I	 will be fail-operational/safe/restorable with low probability of two
failures in critical systems in a 90-day period, and that the prime
mode of restoration is replacement.
There are a number of technology development areas that address
long life that require attention. They relate but are not limited to
software, electric power generation, propellant handling, thermal
devices, life-support equipments, and external operations.
Some key program challenges include design for permanence, costs
Lad schedules, the in-house conduct of systems engineering and
integration, international integration, and funding constraints.
Integration. The maintainability issue for the space station is to
develop a basic design to allow effective maintenance. In part, due
to cost constraints, this may be difficult to implement fully as the
program matures. The operating environment and the fact tha t the crew
members are not maintenance and repair specialists put special,
difficult demands on maintainability. To add to the design problem,
the station is a long-life system (30 years) with international
participation. Some issues relate to commonality of hardware/software
and growth.
Program management (Level B) will be responsible for the integration
of the full maintainability plan. This will include integrating and
scheduling of related effort by Level C according to their assigned
work packages. This will include related logistics activity.
The present program plan (Phase B) calls for baseline space station
configuration selection by the end of the year and documentation of
design and implementation plans (including maintainability) by the end
of 1986.
Costs for providing maintainability are projected to be significant,
warranting careful assessment and attention. Factors that must be
considered include initial design, development, hardware, and scarring
for future modifications; logistics support in space and on the
ground; and supporting activity.
Because of environmental and operational factors, maintainability
by the crew both inside and outside the station will present special
challenges. Automation and robotics may be of special value and
interest and require establishment of design criteria.
6There will be special need ^<^for information. Because of limited
knowledge of the broad range of systems and the limited crew (and
training limitations), there will be a need for basic and updated
maintenance information to be available to the crew. These data will
have to be on board or data uplinked in a timely manner.
NASA has had relatively limited experience with long -life systems.
This raises special hardware vendor problems related to sustained
support and/or availcbility of required data over an extended period
of time that will have to be addressed.
From programmatic considerations, management will have to address:
issues of commonality of equipments and treatm ent between major
systems, approaches to growth and the size of the steps, implication
of foreign involvement on maintainability, and the establishment of a
consistent set of criteria ;hat all elements of the design can use to
assure compatibility.
Shelby L. Owens, Johnson Space Center--Project (Level C; approaah to
Maintainability. The present major thrusts involve maintainability
tra& studies for hardware and software directed at interim
requirements. These studies include commonality.
Some major factors of concern ( not in order of priority) include:
• logistics and crew support requirements including human factors
• impacts on users and on-orbit requirements
• data management and decision making
• autonomous operations
• safety and reverification
• growth
The present plan is to conduct task and trade studies through the
Phase B contracts as identified in the request for proposals. The
statement of work notes that there should be commonality, trade studies
(maintainability versus reliability), maximization of maintainability
features, and approaches that satisfy the requirement for indefinite
life.
In spite of NASA's experience and demonstrated capability to
develop and operate reliable systems, NASA has not developed nor
operated systems with the lifetime demands of the space station, i.e.,
indefinite life, growth in orbit, maintainable in orbit, and
interfacing with other vehicles and multiple interest groups.
Joseph H. Levine, Johnson Space Center--Reliability Division Approach.
Addressed were differences between space station and earlier programs
and reliability-maintainability assurance roles and issues.
C
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The significant maintainability factors for the station that differ
from earlier work are:
• in!afinite life and onboard maintenance
• less time-critical systems and commonality
• fail-operational/fail-safe/restorable
• use of robotics
• onboard fault isolation, restoration
• logistics support
• crew capability limitations
• increased extra-vehicular activity
To provide reliability and maintainability, the reliability division
will have to pursue the following kinds of activity: definition of
requirements and participation in trades, assessment of approaches
including optimization of the use of the crew, evaluation of program
plans and their implementation down to ORUs, and definition of special
tools and standards. The division will need to participate in main-
tainability demonstrations, data system definition and development,
and resolution of problems affecting maintainability matters.
The critical issues are viewed as related to:
• identification of unproven systems and elements difficult to
access/restore
• selection of an approach that assures all groups participate
uniformly
• selection of appropriate techniques to analytically assess
maintenance and general crew time and to minimize use of the crew
• the crew time for prelaunch and direct in-flight maintenance--spare
requirements
• use of robotics for routine and extra-vehicular work
• technology development to enhance program approaches
• studies to provide direction to all phases of logistics: spares
(ground and in-flight), storage, and obsolescence.
Maintainability. MSFC has a major responsibility for identifying and
developing the logistics support program plan for the space station.
This includes the space-born logistics module and its outfitting. MSF^.
also has the responsibility for developing the integrated space station
maintainability plan. It is recognized that equipment design affects
support needs, which in turn impact system effectiveness and
efficiency. These matters should be addressed before the design is
.fixed.
Logistics is considered to include all elements of the operation
(i.e., maintenance planning, logistics analyses and management,
training, equipment handling, and support facilities). The task
includes development of the maintainability plan and encompasses such
matters as recording of equipment status, configuration control,
tracking of operating times, and establishing maintenance procedures.
8The maintainability plan is envisioned to include development of
Level 9 requirements and taking actions that influence the design,
development, and station life. The thrust of the effort is directed
at improved operational readiness, reduced near- and long-term (life-
r
	
	 cycle) costs, and efficient operation of the station. It is intended
that the maintainability plan (system requirements, data requirements,
guidelines for analyses and reviews, and schedule for reviews) be
integrated into the overall program plan.
The proposed maintainability philosophy includes:
• critical systems fail-operational/fail-safe; noncritical systems
fail-safe
• removal and replacement (ORD changeout and return to ground for
rework)
• space station major modules returned to ground as last resort
• onboard diagnostics for detection down to ORU
• noncritical systems allowed to fail-/degrade- operational until
spares are available (resupply, 90-day cycle)
• for health and safety, have planned maintenance
• for contingencies, provide test equipment and tools and provide
functional capability repair on board.
It is recognized that maintainability affects all parts of the
program (reliability, safety, human factors, logistics, crew systems).
All requirements must be integrated and logistically supported.
Requirements will help identify levels of redundancy that in turn
affect system monitoring requirements, replacement/repair decisions,
and spare requirements.
All of this background is required to define corrective and pre-
ventative maintenance policies. (Current activity builds on earlier
work on the problem of maintainability-- Philosophy on Space Sta tion
Main
i
enance/Main	 Sptainability, J. Lusk, MSFC/PMO1, Nov. 28, 1983;	 ace
Staton Maintainability Stuff Input for CDG Study #2, J. H. Leet, KSC/
rw-Lnu, Jan. 1/, IVU4; an	 St
White Papers, JSC, Dec. 1
cyu c. cvrcc, uowao u earth Center--Electric Power Systems. The
electric power generatin system options for IOC are solar photovoltaic
and solar thermodynamic. Maintainability terms were defined:
• Maintainability--Capability to complete maintenance and repair and
the verification of success (impacts design)
• Maintenance--Periodic (and unplanned) activity to prolong design
operation impacts design)
• Reliability--Insight as to when a loss may occur (impacts logistics)
• Repair--Action to return the degraded, malfunctioning, or damaged
items to design operation (impacts crew and logistics)
The design target is to provide an electric power system that will
operate without interruption and with minimum interference from other
9space station program elements. This is one of the critical systems.
yl
	
	
Since nearly all other systems and operations depend on electric
powt:r, an uninterrupted power supply is vital. Interference from
other space station systems should be minimal.
Maintainability consideration iriludes many factors that impact
interface standards, system design, and operational support. Some of
these factors relate to accessibility, override, hazard avoidance,
growth, interface definition, diagnostics, fault detection,
i .	 contamination, resupply, spares, and storage.
Maintainability will be addressed in the Phase B studies. Defini-
tion work on supporting activity and requirements has begun.
F. J. Logan Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)--Platforms and
Attached Payloads. The work includes not just the attached payloads
and free-flying platforms, but also their assembly and servicing
facilities and laboratory module outfitting.
The key to successful design will be the iterative process of trades
between maintainability, system design, and costs. All of the NASA
center work package managers and the Phase B contractors are required
to work this o:oblem.
Issues to be resolved include:
• crew time for maintenance
• reliability versus maintenance
• cost versus availability versus redundancy
• logistics space on board
• resupply frequency
• criticality of element, subsystem
• safety
• commonality
• built-in test/diagnostics versus manual operation
GSFC has soma experience with multimission, modular spacecraft
(MMS) maintenance. These systems were designed so that functions were
distributed and isolated. Failures can be readily identified and
modules easily weplaced through the use of remotely controlled systems.
This is a proven technique that could be used for the space station's
ORUs. Other ideas have potential for the station: the MMS flight-
support system that replaces MMS equipment and a thermal protective
system (built-in layers) that can be easily restored to operational
capability.
a system that continues performing its intended function(s) in the
presence of faults through multiple redundancy, detection/isolation of
failures, and architectural reconfiguration. These capabilities could
^°J P
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allow automatic maintenance, increase autonomy, reduce crew load,
assist in growth, reduce operating costs, and possibly reduce initial
cost.
Research issues include understanding the effects of system
architecture and fault-tolerant software on reliability and
performance. Currently, most reliability analyses tend to be
optimistic because they fail to consider the effects of software
errors, transient faults, double faults, and single-event upsets.
The goal of the La RC fault-tolerant systems research is to define
design and assessment methodologies for such systems. The intended
products of this research are methods for validating the performance
and reliability of complex electronic systems, comparative analyses of
integrated system concepts, and guidelines for the design of verifi-
able, highly reliable systems. To date, moot of the work done has
addressed aircraft matters. But, the facilities and capabilities can
be used to address space station design issues.
Present research includes development of tools and techniques,
using varied analytic and test techniques, for both software and
hardware. One subject under study is the use of redundancy and
periodic maintenance as the means for limiting the probability of
failure.
Fault-tolerant systems can provide graceful degradation through
fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration and, consequently,
provide increased autonomy and reduced testing, enhance identification
of elusive symptoms, and reduce removals associated with unconfirmed
faults. LaRC is verifying the benefits of fault-tolerant systems
through trade-off studies. Such systems can favorably affect costs
and maintenance requirements through the reduction of time, spares,
and operational activity devoted to maintenance/repair/replacement.
Joel H. Lest, Kennedy Space Center (KSC)--Maintainability Philosophy.
Prime maintainability considerations during the early program phase
relate to influencing the design: during the detailed design and
production phase (designing-the-support) and during the operations
phase (supporting-the-design). Because of the close relationship,
integrated logistics considerations and the effect of maintainability
on the logistics system must be considered through all program
phases. The end result will be the system in use at KSC during
operations to support the space station (provisioning, resupply,
maintenance, repair, training, and documentation).
The maintainability philosophy encompasses thoughts expressed by
other NASA precentors:
• maintenance on orbit
• minimal training
• evolution--growth capability
i
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• primary crew function--time for user work with minimum demand on
users
• common hardware and software
• maintainability factored into support and life-cycle cost decisions
The data base (lessons learneu) from past space and related
earth-based systems, including the U.S. Department of Defense and
industry, is being examined and will be factored into the program
development effort.
This earlier work shows that: maintainability must be responsive
to mission and operational requirements and needs to be factored into
the design early and iterated; critical systems should be isolated;
spares should be certified; common interfaces between primary and
secondary systems should be avoided; software language for both flight
and testing procedures should be compatible; flight and ground crews
should be involved in design and review board activity; and costs
should be considered throughout the effort.
Important design and development considerations include: establish-
ment of program-level management and support policy early, as well as
criteria for maintainability; a strong top management advocacy;
assessment of new technology; and establishment of ways to measure the
performance and effectiveness of system implementation.
^J
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Discussion
This section of the report reflects the substance of the roundtable
discussion, without attribution, in the form of short statements. The
statements, which address a range of matters from status to suggested
actions, are organized by philosophy/guidelines, technology, and
organization/management.
PHILOSOPHY/GUIDELINES
• Maintenance/repair (and other space station operational activities)
should not detract the crew from the prime function of mission
support.
• The target of 3 hours per crew member per day for maintenance/repair
is too high. A more practical target might be 3 hours per month.
• Representative maintenance concepts have not been generated by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The matter
has thus far been treated in a very general way. NASA needs to
identify a preliminary maintenance concept as the first step in
developing a maintainability plan. This is needed to guide the
early, as well as later, Phase B activity, when in-depth study of
this important matter is initiated.
• All program participants (government and industry) need to be
provided with a consistent set of maintainability guidelines if
related system activities are to interface effectively.
• The maintenance concept should be quantified, to a reasonable
degree, and provided to all involved groups for review and
comment. The feedback should be iterated. This work should be the
responsibility of a single group, Level B.
• There is an array (depending on criticality) of system requirements,
and each requires separate treatment.
12
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• Cost is an important program driver. Maintainability and repair
considerations impact design and early- and long-term costs. Thus,
it is important to tak- cost implications into account early in the
design effort.
• A system design guideline should be established that states that
the probability of a catastrophic failure will be extremely low,
and a value should be set for this very low probability of failure.
• It is anticipated that NASA will have developed a reasonable
position on maintainability and reliability in the January-February
1986 time frame, when some of the Phase B work is completed.
• NASA has been examining the matters of reliability, maintainability,
and rspairability over a period of several years through intercenter
working groups and special studies. This work has produced reports
and a series of white papers on these subjects. Related earthbound
work has been examined but found to be of limited value in terms of
space station applicability.
• The in-house work has covered operations as well as design and
users' needs related to onboard payloads and freeflyers.
a The Marshall Space Flight Center has developed top-level maintain-
ability guidelines. However, this has not been worked with the
other centers or Level B.
• A separate contract (outside of the Phase B group of contracts)
will be let by MSFC to develop a maintainability plan and help
structure the logistics support plan. This activity will be
iterated with the Phase B work.
• The subject of safety appears to require more attention.
• It is not possible to generalize requirements down through all
systems due to unique services and/or requirements and criticality.
So, goals and guidelines should allow the exercise of reasonable
judgment by the system designer.
• As a matter of principle, the maintainability specification or
criteria should not be too confining. Confinement will not allow
contractors the opportunity to exercise their ingenuity and
creativity.
• To help assure communication between parties, maintainability and
related terms need to be defined.
• Airlines and commercial air transport airplane manufacturers have
developed maintainability guidelines.* Current design is based on
*A report setting forth guidelines developed by Boeing, based on
design/operational experiences with their aircraft down through the
747 aircraft, was given to NASA Level B representatives.
^. W
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identifying incipie:it failures, mechanical or electrical, through
inspections, checks, and testing. This approach should be
considered judiciously for the space station. The question of
blatant failure needs to be addressed. This treatment has to be
given to standby systems too. A point to note is that aircraft
operators, fundamentally, do not replace components at fixed times.
It would appear to be inappropriate to set specific system/
subsystem values for designers; it would be better to set overall
concepts for basic systems.
• In aircraft, for a new design, it has been the practice to dedicate
time (approximately 2 weeks) to a relatively complete set of
maintainability demonstrations. This type of action may be
appropriate for the space station using the buoyancy tank and
mock-ups to simulate extra-vehicular activity operations. However,
in-station (shirt sleeve) operation presents a special problem.
• In commercial aircraft operations there is a minimum operationally
ready equipment list. The flight (operation) does not go without
an operational check-off of these equipments. A similar check-off
may be appropriate for the station before special activity, i.e.,
orbital maneuvering, vehicle docking, and turning on power to an
onboard payload.
• The levels of repair planned for need to be responsive to
appropriate criteria and standards for different classes of system
criticality. The general rule may well be replacement of elements
and components.
• Due to upgrading and replacement, it does not appear that a 30-year
life through direct maintenance is a realistic design driver for
components and elements of the station and could be an unnecessary
cost factor. It would appear to be more realistic to design for
shorter lifetimes with a view to replacement with advanced
components and systems for all but major structural elements.
i
TECHNOLOGY
• A sustaining engineering activity, in view of growth and long life,
will be required as will an ongoing technology development effort
related to maintainability.
• Measures of maintainability need to be defined to assist in and
provide a consistent base for analyses and evaluation.
• The subject of mission success needs to be addressed as part of the
maintainability assessment. There has to be a way to measure and
identify failures to be tolerated through design and performance
assessments.
i
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• Modular design can psy for itself in ease of assembly, test, and
replacement. But, the design must consider accessibility and
simplicity.
• The Langley Research Center work on fault tolerance is currently
directed at aircraft. The facility and staff can be applied to
apace station issues. This application should be examined.
• The Air Force has a large program on redundancy managem!snt.
Contacts should be made to review this work and its applicability
to station development.
• The military services are very involved with the subject of
integrated diagnostics for a self-sustaining weapon system
capability.* However, they have not established an approach to
evaluating designs for maintainability and repairability. This
matter is being worked by the services and should be followed.
• One significant problem is the inability to detect and isolate
equipment failures with high confidence.
• The failure problem manifests itself in: large ambiguities that
are costly in spares, logistics, and induce¢ failures; high false
removal rates (airlines have experienced values as high as 50
percent); the need for large, specialized support groups; shortages
of storage apace and work skills; long mean times for repair and
operational readiness; and extensive test equipment, training, and
documentation.
• The Navy has a program to support the development of integrated
diagnostics. The program's objectives include technology improve-
ment, reduction of false removals, maintainability improvement, and
reduction in cost of diagnostics.
• The Navy's integrated diagnostics effort is directed at providing a
cost-effective capability for detecting and isolating known or
expected problems without ambiguity. It has three phases: Phase I
(present)--concept definition and system specification, Phase II
(FY 1985)--detail specification for software and hardware, and
Phase III (FY 1956-1990)--full-scale development of guidas and
standards.
*Mr. Michael Battaglia of the Naval Electronic Systems Command made a
presentation on this work. His presentation material was distributed.
He also presented copies of the following reports for NASA: Report
for the Department of Defense on the Implementation of Integrated
Diagnostics, The National Security Industrial Association, Sept. 1984
full report and executive summary); and Proceedings of the 1984
National Conference on "Supporting Weapon System Technology Through
The National Security Industrial Association,
I and conference summary).
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The expected payoffs, diagnostic capability should go from
50-75 percent to 99-100 percent; support personnel reduction, 25
percent; training reduction, 50 percent; false alarms from 85 to
1-2 percent; unnecessary removal from 30-70 percent to less than 1
percent; aind time for maintenance should be reduced by 50 percent.
• There is a need to assist the crew in decision making because, as
noted in the request for Oroposal (RFP), crew time is very
important.
• Design to cost and crew time are important evaluation criteria for
trade studies. But, some way to quantify crew time is needed.
• The Air Force Studies Board of the National Research Council has
initiated a study on fault isolation. (See Appendix C--Statement
of Task.) The National Security Industrial Association (NSIA) has
just completed a study on this subject. A report is i,n process.
NSIA is also conducting a technology survey. NASA needs to examine
and keep in touch with these activities.
The NSIA report addresses state-of-technology and future needs.
It shows that management attention from the start is critical and
that diagnostic design; a systems engineering function, has to be
iterative.
• Past experience indicates that overworking thL, crew is a real and
serious problem.
i
• Large electronic telephone switching systems are designed to
provide very high levels of reliability (down times of about 2
minutes per year). These systems use up to 12 levels of
redundancy. They depend on sensing and remote diagnostics for
_trouble shooting down to a low systems level. A central control
station manager directs field repair people (such an approach may
be appropriate for the space station). This capability has to be
designed into the system from the start.
• Representative, important technology development areas are:
knowledge-based systems, laser video disk, expert systems,
artificial intelligence, logic modeling, smart bits, signature
analysis, fault-tolerant designs, probes/robotics, self-improving
diagnostics, and computer-aided design and analyses capability
(i.e., AJE/UPE, CAD/CAM/CAT/CAE, and LSI/VLSI/VRSIC).
• Safe designs should have redundancy in both main and standby
critical systems.
• To keep work loads and time lines for crews contained, automation,
including built-in testing, has an important role to play in
initial and design growth.
• Trade studies should include reliability, safety, and low cost
considering replacement, repair, inspection, and test.
4
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• A starting place for NASA trade studies would be the reference
configuration in the RFP, divided into subsystems and clae:a:s of
functional criticality. The trade studies would identify design
guidelines for desired performance and minimum co4r q
 avid help
develop guidance for iteration with the Phase S contractors.
• Satellite communication earth stations were subjected initially to
periodic human checking. Now, with the system mature, only checks
by instruments are made. The outage time averages about 25 minutes
per year over a 10-year period. Design features are high redundancy
and short chain-of-command.
• It is anticipated that, for the space station, there will be a long
shakedown period followed by more settled and routine operation.
In the past, this transition period has tended to be a problem for
NASA.
• Current satellite systems (communications) have displayed lifetimes
longer than expected. Early satellites had lifetimes of 3 to 4
years; new systems, 9 years and still going. New designs arc
predicted to have useful lives of 10 years. Several factors
contribute to long life: make equipment good, specify existing/
proven equipment, and use fixed-price/incentive contracts. Tie
contractor incentives to system life. Where new equipment must be
used, the key is test, test, and test. If changes are made, make
them in small increments. Make heavy use of redundancy.
• Human factors did not appear to get specific attention. This could
be part of a long-term problem--crew causing problems while fixing
problems. In this regard, it may be a better practice to have
required onboard spares integrated into the system (redundancy)
rather than replaceable.
• There may be a tendency to overstress wearout. Wearout has not been
a problem with unmanned spacecraft. Unproven design has caused
problems indicating a need for careful validation of new designs.
On the station, wearout will have to be dealt with in the sense of
easy access for assessment/replacement and possibly repair.
• To reduce maintainability requirements, design should incorporate
redundancy and have greater capacity/capability than the minimum
acceptable requirements specified. Systems should be designed to
degrade gracefully so that there is tine to decide on and take
action.
ORGANIZATION/MANAGEMENT
• The centers have a responsibility for addressing all maintenance
issues including payloads and spacecraft operating with the
station. The RFP covers the subject, 'put very broadly.
^w
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• The presentations reflect that space station maintainability, per
se, has received some attention but that relatively little
attention has been given to maintainability related to use of the
station as a service center for attached payloads, platforms, and
the orbital maneuvering /transfer vehicles. The Goddard Space
Flight Center has the responsibility for this activity, but it is
not clear that servicing maintainability has been considered. This
includes maintainability of the serviced items themselves.
• The technical aspects of maintainability are not the whole problem.
Organization and management ( assignment of responsibilities and
authorities) are also important and affect grogram success.
• A top-level set of maintainability objectives and strategy is
required to coalesce activity between centers and contractors.
This will allow correlatable definition of criteria for the next
lower level of maintenance and repair design and operational
concepts.
• In weapon systems (possibly for the space station too) operational
readiness problems persist because: system requirements fail to
reflect diagnostic needs; integration of diagnostics not accomp-
lished ( too many separate functions); organizational structure not
in place; analytical tools not available; and funding support short.
• Space station hardware and software maintainability needs to be
addressed by design engineers. This includes component /system
design that provides the capability to accept updated technology
without impacting users. The subject is important enough to
warrant special design reviews.
• NASA has identified many of the major maintainability issues but
not how to resolve them. It is reasonably clear that what is
needed is a logic net and feedback mechanism to integrate and set
the process in motion.
• A problem with long-life systems is replacement of hardware
including instrumentation, i.e., companies discontinue
manufacturing or go out of business. In cases where original
design data are needed and manufacturers could go out of the
business, it may be necessary to make arrangements to preserve
drawing and other information.
• In the commercial communications area there has been heavy
dependency on corporate memory and on careful specification for
final design and development. These factors are expected to be
important to the long-life space station system too.
• There did not appear to be a commonality of approach to maintaina-
bility between center groups and the presentations were general.
However, work is just getting under way. If maintainability is to
be effectively addressed and factored into the design, as it should
be, the effort that is under way must be a serious, in-depth effort
4Summary Observations
The panel discussed and drafted a definition of and an approach to
maintainability. This definition and approach is presented here.
The panel organized in two groups to consider the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) present posture on
maintainability and the questions and issues raised. One group
summarized views on maintenance concepts and the other on systems/
technology. The observations of the two groups were reviewed by the
panel and are alsosummarized in this section of the proceedings.
Finally, a general summary statement is presented.
Subsequent comments submitted by panel members--J. W. Schaefer
(remote testing) and P. E. Partridge (replacement/maintainability
philosophy)--are presented in Appendix D.
MAINTAINABILITY DEFINITION
In view of the need for a common understanding of maintainability,
a definition of maintainability and a process for implementing the
capability was ceveloped and briefly reviewed by the panel. This
definition and process follows:
Maintainability is the capability to carry out a set
of procedures which will enable the space station system
to perform its mission with minimum disruption and
maximum safety. Low overall cost is a system criteria.
The term mission includes all elements of the space
station system. It entails the servicing of other
spacecraft and user equipments/instruments associated
with the space station itself and the polar platforms
that will interface with maneuvering and transfer
spacecraft, serviced by the Shuttle.
Maintainability is not reliability or commonality.
Procedures should not be confused with design, i.e., a
system design must provide the capability to maintain
19
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the system performance and enable economical repair and
replacement of components with no disruption of service.
..'
	
	
Thus, the design must accommodate maintenance
procedures. Operational procedures should encompass
switching to fault-tolerant or other built-in
redundancy.
The design of the system should be such that it will
facilitate maintainability to achieve lowest overall
cost.
I	 But which procedures should be selected and
tl
	
	
implemented? Here, reliability and commonality enter.
They are products of specific design.
"	 To determine the maintainability procedures to use,
w.
	
	 trade-off studies are made considering maintainability,
reliability, commonality, supportability (logistics)
under Che constraint of minimum disruption of critical
systems, maximum personnel safety, and lowest overall
cost.
These studies and the design approach can be
nip	 addressed through:
• Use of the request for proposal reference con-
figuration to identify criticality of major systems
hardware and software, in a hierarchical manner,
using failure mode and effects analyses plus time to
restoration to operating conditions.
• Performing trade studies that minimize cost and
consider replacement (including logistics), repair,
redundancy and fault tolerance, reliability,
commonality, and other factors.
• Using the result of these studies to define a set of
major system design guidelines considering such
matters as crew maintenance time, reed for storage
on orbit, modularity, extra-vehicular activity, and
internal vehicular activity.
• Developing preliminary designs that incorporate the
results of the trade-off analyses.
• Repeating above for subsystems.
f
THE GROUPS
The concept group was chaired by K. Holtby. Its members were J.
Barker, A. Mager, C. Mathews, G. Neumann, J. Schaefer, and C.
Syvertson.
The systems/technical groi,p was chaired by J.
members were M. Battaglia, M, Grogan, R. Hammon
Metzger, and P. Partridge.
Harrington. Its
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Concept Group Observations
•
•
•
•
•
A reference concept for maintainability is needed for all center
and contractor groups. This concept should address such things as
fail-operational/fail-safe, on-condition maintenance, inspection
philosophy (e.g., off line for major maintenance), and onboard
spares versus redundancy.
Maintainability integration should occur at the systems engineering
and integration (SE&I) level. A cadre of contractor personnel may
have to be located at the SE&I office for this function or may have
to attend periodic meetings to integrate maintainability plans.
Servicing of satellites, orbital transfer vehicles, and other user
vehicles should be considered along with the space station
maintainability plans at the SE&I level.
A remote maintenance center on the ground should be stud ? nd and
evaluated.
Trade studies are needed to evaluate external crew activity versus
automated systems for external maintenance. This also applies to
manual versus automatic inspection.
Each orbital replaceable unit WHO has to be testable at its
interface for performance. Don't go to too low a level too
soon--an ORU should probably be the biggest component that can go
through the hatch.
As failure rates for components decrease (e.g., microprocessor
integration), the number of components in an ORU can increase.
Software changes should be made by data link from the ground.
Configuration control of software should be handled in the same
manner hardware is handled.
Distributed computing systems are recommended in order to provide
isolation of critical and noncritical functions and embedded
software. All computers on any given data bus should be tested
together in a systems analysis and integration laboratory.
Avoid reinventing systems (e.g., control moment gyros and redundancy
management). NASA should coordinate with the Department of Defense.
Advanced technologies should be developed in parallel with
mainstream space station systems and components but should not be
controlled in the same detail or charged with the costs associated
with a mainstream development.
Appropriate for advanced automation application are
-- robotic arm
-- fault-tolerant systems
-- diagnostic systems
-- repetitive operations and recording.
NASA should review the National Research Council's Air Force
Sturies Board summer study on diagnostic technology.
Budse::s for maintainability matters should be assigned to
contractors and performance against these plans/budgets tracked.
A system for surfacing critical items at Level B should be
established.
Human factors engineering should focus on safe handling of equipment
and maintenance tasks including such matters as restraints and foot
holds. Anthropomorphic models should be used during design.
•
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Mock-ups should be used to demonstrate both external and internal
vehicular activity functions.
• Advanced technology should be introduced in an evolutionary
manner. To the extent, possible new technology should be
introduced in noncritical applications and then graduate into
critical systems.
Systesls/Technology Group Observations
Requirements necessitating a high degree of maintainability relate
to flight and crew safety, preservation of mission, and continuity of
service.
The most appropriate approach to basic trade-offs between reliabil-
ity and maintainability for given subsystems include: use of best'
technology availah)e, addition of redundancy as required to achieve
mean time to failure objectives for the function, and addition of
maintainability as required for the criticality of the function.
Key questions raised ask: does computer modeling have a role in
answering questions relating to maintainability, and can maintain-
ability be added downstream? The respective responses are:
• Yes--various programs exist to predict failure paths and modes and
mean time to failure. Existing programs should be used where
possible to avoid high costs of special software development.
• Not economically--should be part of the design concept at the
beginning (i.e., diagnostics and switch over to hot spares);
capability is expensive to add later.
Different systems will require different maintainability
approaches, depending on the mission requirements. For example:
• The communication and data processing system would probably have
built-in spare units that could be switched to in an emergency.
• The power system could degrade to a fraction of its total power
before crew safety or flight safety were affected. Replacement of
panels, for example, could wait until the next supply ship. There
may be no need for onboard spares.
• Life-support system redundancy is obviously essential.
These examples illustrate how different the ORU problem is for
major subsystems.
NASA raised many technical questions relating to the implementation
of maintainability. A common theme was found.
There is an understandable desire to categorize the maintainability
elements of the space station, preferably in quantitative terms. This
leads to questions such as:
• What are the drivers and their relative importance?
iM
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• For each element, how are initial cost versus maintenance cost and
mean time to failure versus mean time before replacement compared?
• Can mathematical models be set up for the above?
The range of elements on board the station vary widely in their
criticality and technical composition. No single, meaningful, broadly
applicable answer is possible. The maintainability of each element
must be evaluated case-by-case in accordance with specific appropriate
criteria, in order of importance, such as:
• crew safety
• achievement of mission objectives, continuity of service from
customers' viewpoint
• maintaining long-life integrity of the space station
• crew time
Insufficient• data now exists on the various space station elements
to permit definitive, in-depth analytical study. It is clear that
this level of study needs to be deferred until the new contractors
reach a substantive point of subsystem definition including
approximate weight,
size, and, most important, technical heritage.
To minimize the extent of maintenance, it would be highly desirable
to use, to the extent possible, space proven hardware. This not only
eliminates development cost, but also provides a high degree of
confidence in the equipment--based on current experience, in some
instances, 7- to 10-year lifetimes.
It is not considered realistic to attempt designs for 30-year
lifetime because of extensive and costly development and technical
obsolescence. Even if achievable, it is doubtful that 30-year
subsystem equipment would be desired because of technological
improvement.
Close coupling is required between the NASA system designers/
integrators, who set the overall system specifications, and the Phase B
subsystem contractors, to provide an interactive system definition/
design process. The various contractors should consider the problem
of maintainability, i.e., amount of redundancy, nature of redundancy,
monitoring, accessibility, tools needed for replacement, from the
start of the project and not as an add on.
Based on two decades of successful commercial communications
satellite experience, it is now possible to procure equipments/
subsystems that have demonstrated 7 to 10 years of operating life in
orbit without requiring maintenance. The design and construction of
these equipments should follow these principles:
• Design--Base the design on previously flight-proven designs to
the greatest extent possible.
• Components --Use
 
military-specified parts plus additional
burn-in as per current commercial satellite practice.
• Redundancy--Phis feature is essential.
i
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Equipment life is a statistically defined variable; once design
problems have been solved, a back-up unit must be available no matter
how low the probability of failure of the original unit. The number
of redundant units depends on the importance of that unit to the
mission and its expected probability of failure. This number may
likely be less for the space station than for a 10-year commercial
satellite since the latter cannot be maintained during its lifetime
while the space station will be supplied every 90 days.
In support of this concept, it is noted that large electronic
communication switching systems, which operate with only about 2
minutes of outage per year, achieve this result by extensive use of
redundancy.
Based on this experience, NASA should, where possible, procure
subsystems that have proven to be reliable. When such units do not
exist, it is recommended that they be designed and built in accordance
with the above principles.
It is also recommended that periodic testing of units be performed
through the monitoring of significant parameters rather than by
complete engineering tests of all subsystem performance parameters.
Contractor personnel involved in the design and construction of they
space station and its many subsystems may not be available to NASA
during the lifetime of their operation. NASA engineers should work
very closely with the contractors during the design and construction
period so that they become thoroughly familiar with the theory,
operation, and test of these equipments. Such experience is
indispensable in later operation and maintenance in orbit. It will
likely require a full-time NASA presence in contractors' plants.
Y j
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Closing Comments
The panel recognizes that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) is in the formative period of development of its
organization and staffing for the apace station maintainability
program. The panel is pleased to have had an opportunity to provide
its views to NASA at this formative stage in the development of the
program. The panel also recognizes that although maintainability has
been under active study for an extended period by NASA, the approach
to be followed by the space station program has not been developed and
awaits input from the Phase B (concept and preliminary design)
contractors.
The panel takes the position that maintainability is a critical
element of the program. It permeates design from the very start o
concept development through design of hardware and software throug
operations. Maintainability affects costs from design through tea
and through operations. It is a critical element in maximizing
utility through operational availability and long life.
The panel's brief dialogue on the subject with NASA space stati
program representatives leads the panel to make these broad
observations:
• It is clear that maintainability considerations must be address
early in the design. An early set of maintainability design
guidelines based on a stated maintainability philosophy should
identified. This should build on an evaluation of program need
that include the station itself, its services, and associated
free-flying spacecraft and payloads.
• NASA needs to be sure it moves effectively to develop an overal
maintainability strategy/approach and plan and to communicate t
fact to program Level C and associated contractors.
25
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• NASA needs to be sure that the Phase B contractors, at the time of
commitment to preliminary design, have the guidance required for
trade—off analyses that account for such matters as initial
operating configuration cost, system support costs, crew time,
scarring, and robotics.
• It is important that the system engineering and integration
organization have the responsibility and authority reflected in the
organizational structure to develop and implement the required
maintainability plan in time to affect Phase B preliminary design
activity.
The panel believes that NASA's space station program nanagement has
time, between the letting of the Phase B contracts and the development
of guidance for the start of preliminary design (some 10 to 11
months), to take the kinds of actions addressed above. However,
success requires early, quick, definitive action on the part of
program management at all levels.
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APPENDIX A
6CE STATION ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Maintainability/Repairability Panel Meeting
AGENDA
March 20-21, 1985
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama
1
Wednesday, March 20
Introductions
Objectives
Approach
Charge to Panel--Terms of Reference
Briefs: Onboard Maintenance and Repair--
Current Views and Key Issues/Questions
Individual Experiences and Views:
Philosophy, Requirements, Specifications
Open Discussion
Organization of Subgroups to Draft:
Position Statements
Thursday, March 21
Subgroup Meetings
Concept group--K. Holtby (Chairman), J. Barker,
A. Mager, C. Mathews, G. Neumann, J. Schaefer,
C. Syvertson
Subsystem/technical group--J. Harrington (Chairman),
M. Battaglia, M. Grogan, R. Hammond, C. Marvin,
S. Metzger, P. Partridge
Subgroup Position Drafting	 Subgroups
Review of Subgroup Material
	
Panel
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILM W
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R. Greenwood,
Chairman
R. Carlisle, NASA
NASA
(See Appendix B)
Panel
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"The purpose of this round table discussion is to develop a
better understanding of the optimal degree of maintainability
appropriate for the Space Station.
It is clear that Space ;station subsystems oust be capable of an
almost indefinite life through a well planned process of
scheduled maintenance, a comprehensive capability to deal
quickly and efficiently with unscheduled, maintenance, and a
periodic exchange of major equipment elements. In addition,
these subsystems must be'capable of being upgraded and expanded
in .,order to meet the increasing operational requirements of the
Space Station. Maintainability is viewed primarily as an aspect
of design which facilitates the process of maintenance, namely,
the restoration of equipment to operational status following a
failure. The process of maintenance involves many aspects.of
Space Station design and operations. Initially, it involves
those features of the equipment itself that either facilitate
maintenance or reduce the need for maintenance, such as more
reliable parts, long-life designs, built-in diagnosis and fault
isolation, orbital replacement unit (ORU) commonality, good
access, clear labeling, and other related- aspects of human
factors engineering. These design features are fully utilised
through the exercise of the appropriate procedures, skills, and
training on the part of the crew. Lastly, there should be the
required ORUs, ample associated information, the secondary
facilities to effect the repair, and an environment that is
supportive of the maintenance process.
Crew productivity is also heavily involved with maintainability.
The commercial and scientific objectives of the Space Station
are critically dependent on the availability of the crew to work
with payloads.. aTbsse . ..,payload activities should not be
compromised by the crew performing maintenance. Making Space
Station subsystems appropriately maintainable is a logical
approach which can meet both the commercial and scientific
objectives of the Space Station and still permits the necessary
maintenance to be accomplished.
As stated above, the purpose of this round table discussion is
to gain a better understanding of the appropriate degree of
maintainability	 within	 Space Station subsystems." -- .
the kinds of issues that are most likely to be raised would
include the following.
What are the requirements that most necessitate a high
degree of maintainability?	 ,
h
^!t
41
What is the appropriate process to identify the right
amount of maintainability?
What are the "driver" issues in formulating a
maintainability plan?
Given the manner in which the Space Station is organized,
what is the preferred approach to conducting the system
engineering trade studies necessary to identify a
near-optimal degree of maintainability?
Once a near-optimal degree of maintainability has been
identified, what is the preferred approach for
implementation, given the present Space Station Program
organization?
What is the moat appropriate approach to the basic
trade-off between reliability and maintainability' to
achieve a given subsystem availability?
How should one balance the need for maintenance (as
reflected by the MTHF) against the ease of maintenance
(as reflected by the MTTR)?
What is the appropriate process to determine the level of
ORU that is most consistent with crew time, crew skillst
crew. training, stowage volume for spares, secondary
equipment, etc.?	 ti
What are the most cost-effective applications of advanced
automation to assist in attaining high maintainability?
Of the various aspects of human factors engineering that
are applicable to maintainability, which appear to.be the
most cost-effective?
Does computer modeling have a role in the maintainability
questions?
What is the preferred approach to allocating maintenance
goals to various subsystems?
How does one best preserve maintainability objectives in
an environment of scarce resources?
Assuming constraints on IOC costs may limit maintainabil-
ity, can one subsequently add maintainability? Is there
such a thing as "maintainability scar"?
How does one know if maintainability objectives are being
met, short of flight operations?
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	 NASA GSFC
MAINTAINABILITY
WP-3
The GSFC role, with respect to maintainability Is highlighted by the
diverse SSPE's that the GSFC is responsible for. Despite the differences
between the platforms, the attached payloads. assambly and servicing
facilities, and the outfitting of a lab module, the key to a successful
maintainability program for all four WP-3 elements is the ability to
conduct three-way iterative trades between maintainability studies,
preliminary system designers. and design to cost. The NASA managers have
the responsibility to insure that this iterative process converges on the
desired system n^ SOR.
To arrive at the optimum maintenance program for each WP-3 element will
require a concerted effort involving WP-3, the other WP's, and the Phase B
contractors. The contractors have a hard requirement to develop an
on-orbit maintenance plan; to develop the plan will require hard decisions
by WP-3 in defining parameters that must be studied, and insuring that the
feedback to the designers is continuous. Inputs from the other WP's are
required for ORU commonality studies that impact the maintenance plan. Some
of the issues that must be resolved to satisfy the requirement for
indefinite station life are:
o	 % of crew time available for maintenance
o	 Trade reliability vs. maintenance
o	 Trade cost optimization vs. availability
o	 Logistic space on board the Space Station
o	 Resupply frequency
o	 Criticality of element or subsystem
o	 Safety
o	 Commonality
o	 Cost of built-in test equipment and diagnostic equipment
vs. manual operation
Experience at GSFC
The GSFC is not without experience in the development of flight hardware
that requires maintenance. In the mid-seventies, the first in-orbit
maintainable spacecraft, the Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS), was
developed at GSFC.
The basic premise of the MMS design was to isolate functional distribution
so that when a failure occured, only one module would have to be replaced,
and it was readily identified. This philosophy could be used in the
design of Space Station ORU's to facilitate fault isolation and ORU
design. The MMS module attachment fittings, with the associated blind mate
scoop-proof electrical tonne-tors were originally designed to be remotely
serviced using the RMS with the service tool attached. This proven design
is one possible solution for Space Station ORU's.
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Although the WS Flight Support System ( FSS) is not planned to be serviced
In orbit, the system was designed for maintainability with an expected life
of fifty missions. The design philosophy used in the design of the 12
mechanisms could apply to the required mechanisms on the Space Station
servicing facility and other Space Station mechanisms. Each dechanism
consisted of a command drive unit with two motors, gearing, brake and
overload switch, providing full redundancy up to the output shaft. All
mechanisms have a manual override in the unlikely event that a failure
would occur in the mechanism. Another FSS design feature that could apply
to the Space Station is the thermal blankets with removeable outer layer
painted with a white thermal finish. When the thermal paint deteriortates,
the outer blanket is removed and replaced with the remaining layers left
Intact. This could be carried further for Space Station with several
layers painted and removed as they lose their effectivity.
I
1 U9	 OlWGWAL PAUC 1^j
OF POOR QUALITY
co
.>
W ,r
oq C
w
0
v d c
M M y
vl Vl U
•.	 u
C1 M .-^ w
- 4 tCp w y
4. w .+ to 4
0 C w >
• .-/ O p
GO O u	 •
y u y O
rp u t .^ u
w .4 00 t n r-
0 0 k G 0
m .r m m
ww-1x
M.
l.• v
ti
SIN
0
Qu
Wr
W
O
rr
W
C:
J
r
Q
L6
V7
W Z
J O
r
U. O
r.e
O Q
Z p
LS O
o LLJ
W d
J .Or uLLJ 
W SJ
sc 44C
V!
J
QLL
LLO
WL.9ZWV!W
YS
WS1.-
Z
VfZO
uZO
U.
O
W
W
k^
r=au
ui
cn
W
O Cp4i
O
^J
f
W
O
JOtLL
uo
I
111
I- NI
zOP
a
v
aa
N
O
tu
z
w
m
2
ulH
a
Ix
LU
J
O
H
n
aU.
w
z
Q
W
F=
z
Q
w
Z
W
s
Z
611
Q
w
Q
•
Y.
w
w
C2
w
Ix
N
}
LL
w
CL2
s
z
w
cc
}
m
uj
U.
w
•
C9
W
M
w
w
m
•
V)
v
J
Q
z
W
w
LL
z
w
•
,r.
V/
ui
corS^
r^
^r
z
W
mi
O
LL
O t;
Cl
N
es! fW7
4fl
ob
Nto.
X ^
112
IY
Zt.7hi
W N
O
W WH Y
S V Y
C Q N
Q LPO
1U4 ^ Ww 3
U LL
F-
N Z OQ N
FY—L&
O B-1 Q
J ui
uiU ® J
cc
OI^ J
H W 0-
^ J
F W ^
FC9 N L& 1 i
PZ6 y O 1Ji
inZ Z U Q
Q O Q 1--1
N Z ^ W
c C9 1--a LY
O N W OZ W SO O h- qzsL
C=
W
OHNZ
OU
O
Z S
W
O cn
NN
O U
w1`—a ccn
W Q
2
co
~Q
J R Cn
LLJ CDCY CY
J W 1•-
H s-. F- Q1- Q W Z LLY U CY Wa ^ Y 3 t~!» wZ 1-4 1.- F- Z coQ Z H LL Q c^C9 J O CY O a.a1- H H N 1- O Cn
NLLLJ am
LL' CD J
U N cr
JQ
H
J
Q W
O H
CD
1- W cr
d W N N
1Z-1
S HU F O
H ® m U
cJ crJQ O N
C = O O O
LAJ N 1~-
Z Q J Lr HC1: CY O W J
W CL LA. ZOO W S Q H
cm
CD 4c 1-i1- J H
Li LLJ Us
N O O W0	 0	 0 1.4 u Q LL.
1Ji
WCY J b—
ca N O W _i
Q CY CY > > W
0. O= W Q 9
m
W J W
NW LL.
Z W La
0
Ac
VD Led
42ZE
^ Vb
u o o
f
..^^ hem«	 -	 ^
e,
y\
\I
<2
\i
\\ LLJ
^
G S 2
Sc
ui
_3
cc wCD Lj k 2g^/ 2 0
kqcn L C80 aE b »r^ LL.2^ w¥ °cn
\^ » u ^c oC/)
rf ƒ^ k^ k^w ^G « ¥
^^
 CD ^u
k ^ ^^ R /2
@^) kk 2 ^t3= u o
/ ^ (D Uj6
\ ^
7QRIGWAL f ".t
=	 OF FOUR QUALI.
..
1!4
U
Ir
W^
Li
Q
V y
Ca
O
-,
O
0
C;
I-W
z
_O
1--
Q ,.
^J
W W
J 4K
Q <3
W L`
O^ 
N
z
Q
cr
LLJ
t	 J
t O
F^-
FZ^	 J
Q
N
N ^
w V
W
a
N
J
< N
S2 -1
^ W
J
< !O!
7.. i
<
t5
t
.t
co
J
<
N ^
W
D CL
N
Lai
0
z
UW
7.
<
LLI
O W Ot,%  —
r-
0
C
4
L+C
•
J,41copa- 
()F POOR QVOLll'Y,
C)	 crC)	 Cr qKCk!
Lj.j CL	 V)
V)	
z
V) LLJ
LLJ	 I.— M
CL -C
CY—	 LAJ
DZ cl:0 -ccU :E
L1J	 ^	 • •
L
WW
M
ZD	 -cc 3r.	 LJ Z< or
Z oc	 LLJ C)LL.	 cr- (n	 I.- LAJ	 Z	 LLJ
	
0	 0 LA-	 I..-
	
C)	 —0	 x
	
M	 V)	 LLJ
Q	 0 CL	 L46J
N	 4ll
6	 6
q
6
® MJ
b
e^
1	 Iq	 q 1q
e_
I r
I^
® n^
W
H
Z
O
'
rA'w
YI
N
W
MrW
yyJW
m
cc
M
H
cO
mZ
J
0
c
N
q
q 	 1
q
P6
ORIG4NAL PAS= 6S
OF POOR QUALlYV
117
;ti	 I
j
i
ORoIGWAL PAGE M
OF POOR QUALITY
rO
m
a
Q E
0
a0
118
m
Q
Q C
=_Z V VC
c
Q O0i _O
w
d w
CL
O "' OO +.
^'ELI
LL
v ;:.
LL OE OQ
O
.o V
a! '00
c
N
°
cm
-a E
.o
w LL
U.
z
ra row ® oM c oC a .0
O u U.
mQLL
O
F-
0
LLz
OV v
zO
y O'
E
0 E
c
EE E
0No^c>
® Ix iI-
L
Zk
tZ
O
H
Q
Z
LU2
LLI
mi
CL
W
H
H
Z
Q
cc
WJ
O
F^HJ
Na.
Z
LL
LL
O
1
W
0
cc
•r- -►
 .0- tom. ti.
NW
w w 5
ZVZ^	 ILCW7	 ^ m
O 3 =^ Q
co
wCOa
w
Q
0
Z
E
Z a) « E
m > ca 2
w °^a,
M^
119
46- -i •41, -W w- .0- a.
co
aQ
Cc ED
W W
C7 Q
• • •
U
Q
^
^^
W
>ad^il
Qa
Ow
v ac a ^ ac
U
Q yt
^c
o^
120
II
I
	
W	 W, ^ 	 z	 >.Z
	
V "Z
	
Qa	 z^zQGil Z
Q	 H ^ C
rn	 vac a	 N	 -^ aU^	 V Q N V W^
1Y
7
L	 O
	
S	 WN
	
N	 a
	
LL	 W
L
O	 Z
uj
	
Cc	 y0)	 Z
Z €Cal	 Z^	 ZOUJ
r	 Q ^ c	 ®N	 WN
V o E a 2^
	
a0
vffia v Ei d ()dr	 M^
al
ya. • .^^.Y	 ..	 ^ SiG•!1•h ^.y4 r_
	
.__
Y' 1
°2°
I
_I
^• r
v
^0cc dC b°«0 1
 c
US
od;; p
E E•C
' ^E
I
I
I I
® I II ^ I I
j
w
I
G
l
I
a.O I O2
I
I
I
I v
II w II Z I z II
I ^ I ^ I
I O II I
I
II itw I wm I
I ® I I e—
I W I w® I U
I v I o^c 1
I Li I LU iI a I ^ I
1 m I I( I I
cCc
V
Ee_
E E
C °° x °c
d
CC
Ia
W
J
Q
OHa
cc
d
O
W
IM
N
Z
cc
LLI
J
O
H
J
LL
Na
0
a°c
E
a.
122
V
v
^ a
'^	 N c
N ^ !
c
Z
Q
f	 I	 i^
O
^"	 J
LL
LLO
M w ^
_ t
C °	 a
+^	 x
IL 0
w	 LL
cN
A_-
J
O.O
c
o
v^
c^ aD
i
E
0cc
0	 ow
o	 vw
Q U. c
E
co
c
OH
^¢ z
Fl
•I
N
of
i^
II
O'
n
U'
k^
123
124
z
a02J
VwN >
ww
00
•
e
E m
o ue
m ^
c
cn
m y
O 43C
c _
W
o G
N c
m •^
v ^
WGN
8
2y
aW
CC
04C0 
ac a
a
R
2
^ W 0
P a z>i rPoJz ua
r Nyw6z
oNZGa1.1
u iiRz¢r0
.N
.N
m
d W o w2Z
CA a
>zoz
205-0,
a o0 	 ua >24
Z v30^a^^^wNWU^N
toW gIG ^<	 p • s •
y_mv_v--v_me_—_---
a
	
o o rn	 t
w
z	 ate w
	
fQ¢
o	 Aga x
	
v	 cZpy
pr ow w0	 r	 >zazcc
	
V2!'0 w = W	 JURO?^OyWzzw2WW¢^OWO Z WNSwrWWUUU
	
Uo¢r NN00 W	 Ora0Q0 waFso
• s e • •	 J	 a w 51"eIv gt¢ ^^ u?
2 $p	 mow¢
••	 •
>o
a uQ U
NOau
LL a
	 ORIGMAL PAGE 66
•	 OF POOR QUALITY.
., •,...	 cam' -c^{^'	
_ .._-
E ._
I
W
W .
V7 JW
V1 A
' Q ZSd
a
Q ►-
C7  J
^°.' as
a a
J CC
J O
C G..
CL
^ ~ O
^ J `
W ^
= O
W Q °"K Q
w LDz z z WLLJC
'j 3 W Ot2C-t S =
2 O F- h- C L)LL- GA Q O O O
d Cn QQ 67 A 2c
.... d W A CJ) "'
W C W ate„ O d Oh A
LU
~^ W W C
.U. LD
Q Z d hW-Z W O ZV) Q J m uj S m a O
«
U)
- A O > W ^_LU LL LLJ 0-
7r- 1^-^- UO G OC W >- W C3 J_ J_
•~.• C dW d Q co W h-
O c~n at>-. W O W ^_ O
fo M:
ti: h- Q QO W „M:
,,, z JJ 3 ^
W } > C I--. O C C}
w N Z: W U £ U £ Z U
F.
IJ%
00
Q?1
r
h-
W
W	 O
N
Ss	 u
a
^	 s
M! I
r
J J
OG Q Fa-
cr cz A .Q Q
Z O
e... C
Q
/
®
p® 
J
N
u>
/ 'T ^^\ 00
ax
uj `
W=
a 1^
CL IL
-v
^
iJ , n40
125
0	
•1
LL
z	 i
ly
r—
Wdr.1 O
Q UJ cn
} WY 07 J
CA) cn Q WJ
~d OD: J W W d'
l7 J U U WQ aa
a d co cn N O
dy
a
h
dQr
s
W
Q•C]
Q
h4
It
l^WZ
QWJ
ZOco
cnW
LD
J
QC
OCd
OhZ
Whao:
LDWhZo-..
N
3O
cA
hUdC=hZOU
Oh
GWZCdWJ
ZO
cnWJ
}
JddQ
ZO
hdh
Z
W
W
J
CL
Q
CC
LIDO
d
0h
ZO
•r
7
	
vies°°	 W`
U1
00
o'+
h
W
W OJ	 N
SS VD;Q7	 ^
126
}h
-+ WJ J
W Q07 Q hW Z
Q d ZhZ O
d
Z	
r
h
/ y C9
a z
W l
^JS
y^ w a
f'
Q
= u
La
WZ
Cd
m
Cn s
Cl
Y
Q ^h ^-^h >CZ Q
cnh WZ Z
D Z J
} z WC' h d Qh
C>OG
do
y^Y^
!	
p.
^	 1 Y^^ C
127
ui
"Ln Z Q
•.
co W O F-O^ t- J N h
E
' W ° ow N c+
cc tj
`	 'PI U- LU G 42 V 6L VS °" Q d .
!^'a
N U= N` '7 Z A •..
C d-N ... d W ZC/) rA A Q W N Q QU Z} C A I- W A AW} I- O C W = J W OF
~ W W W O L C= W 0.J ° N= 1- O A v
tD W N A tY A >.Z A A A Z S Z F- Z N N
.... .. ... Z ._. tD N cc
uj
A
u
VLU LJL >- _^ 6Ji W£ O Z:..	 I
I}-
>: 3
•-^+ o
m
I T
•- O ..J } N O O OJ W J tY S C N U V
• •- A Q O_ .--. ^ W t-} m d U J O 0.= W A U-
^=dm Cl- (D WO
r .-- W Cn La. C W ` Z W Z Z WJ AJ lJ O V 3 m ~ -cc Z Uv 0
1$- co W N U
^•
m Q V W O C Z QW Z d ui W= U ui S= 6D O 1-
e. N A m CD V Cn Z --• VCM Q Z A I W i Q Z Z .- F-- W
= Z P- V I = = W 3 $ C.4- Z O 4 N N$ CD Q d C X.
.. = W m W N Z J O C W W
= Q O } F- LU C ui d /- A AW F- W I,= J W
a^ A N I- Q m N tD N 4-
=' C J Z} Z A W r A Z ZQ •- d N a-. N C C .--. O -jJW m d N Q C U•J Q N J Z W 3 F- O W A
^adOOr =m W I-WN •• = V m W d z N F-Z Q I •-- £ Z O O VO t-- Y 6- O O N .O W U V WN z U ^-. U .^ C -+ Z 7N •-+ O C F- W _ Cn t- > W W O
" W Q U W d J W N W J J Cd C dm = Z N N >-to A h- Z W h- G W f.7 Z
w ^q W b•- C N -J W O= N t--
CO
W d W W
cr
Fa °^Wj W2 Q
!!40 i i• 0 a 0 0
^j
o
i.Y+V 0
r: Y0
^. LL
^ U
Y
L\Yco 0
128
co
=	
U	 N
cn	 C	 N
cn
	 W	 C
W	 Z	 .^.
Ln
LL)
	 O	 O	 3	 OLLJ 
	
W	 L'i
,aE	 a	 NQ	 tJ	 U	
Q	 N
a	 W	 °O
A	 LD
W	 h	 A
Q	 l
a	
^-	 U	 O
LL)	 ce-
J	 O	 J	 Z
J	 O	 H	 W
W	 Z	 zO	 4	 ..
z	 W	 a	 Q	 >
o	 A	 Z	 d	 ~W	 1-O	 W	 ..
b	
£	 J	 O	 U
^_	 !-°	 J	 A	 O	 U	 W
N	 U-
J J	 A	 Q	 C	 OW	 N	 a	 dIm=
d G H	 N	 N	 =	 Q	 J	 N	
W C
W Z	 N	 W	 O	 •-+	 c	 C	 p
a H=	 O	 co
LLJ	 cc 
	6W-	 ^_-	 w aZ O	 Q	 1-	 U	 ^ .-.	 ^	 3	 £_
LLJcr
C	 N	 Q	 U W
	 z	 O p..
Z:	 A	
>	 FW- Q	 C	 LLJ	
.n
NI	 U d	 Q	 a Z	 a	 tD	 }U' OW	 a	 O	 O
J	 a z	 a	 O	 O QY	 C N	 W	 z¢	 J	 2	 O
Uj	 C3-J	 W C
	 LD	 Q C
	 Q	 !W-	 W
N	 a W	 J	 ¢	 Q O	 O	 ^
	 cc~
O	 " ..	 M: m	 a, W	 a W
.../-	 Va- Q	 C LD	 z	 _	 3	 N	 O£
i	 V A
	
C
CV-
	
f:J G	 O	 W O
	 '-- ^ 	 IN	 W J
b-^.	 .j	 .°p	 A	 0.	 N	 A	 d	 G
LLI	 c:
LU	 4D	 OD
O
r)
e	 $^
.... .._.._	 _.	 =rho ^... .
129
APPENDIX C
Code Designator for Group Described:
commission on Engineering and
Technical Systems	 Committee on Fault Isolation
ASSEMBLY OR COMMISSION	 COMMITTEE
Air Force Studice Board
DIVISION, OFFICE, or BOAKD 	 SUB-UNIT
Staff Officer: Vernon H. Miles
STATEMENT OF TASK
The ability of the United States Air Force to generate and sustain wartime
aortic rates or up time of non-flying systems is severely affected by the
ability of maintenance personnel to rapidly isolate and subsequently replace
or repair malfunctioning components. Self repairing and self reionfigurable
systems of the future art absolutely dependent on an ability to isolate
malfunctions in order to respond with an optimum alternative. Requirements
for maintenance manpower and training depend on the effectiveness of fault
isolation systems and techniques ranging from Built in Test (BIT) and
Automatic Teat Equipment (ATE) to technical data for troubleshooting and
manual case equipment. Among the Air Force systems and subsystems of interest
are avionics, flight contiol systems, propulsion equipment, secondary power
systems, ground communications-electronics, and missile systems, both tactical
and strategic. Modern technology offers the opportunity to improve the power,
accuracy and reliabilty of fault isolation systems.
The study will essentially consist of four tasks:
1. Determine the United States Air Force's present use of fault
isolation, the present state-of-the-art of fault isolation, and
assess them against the requirements for fault isolation capability
out to the year 2000.
2. Analyze the potential for advancing the present state-of-the-art and
potential pay-off for various levels of improvement.
•	 3.	 Assess the possibility of reducing the Air Force's requirements for
skilled maintenance personnel through improved fault isolation
systems, with particular attention to the application of artificial
intelligence technology.
4. Recommend future research and exploratory development that will
achieve the necessary improvement in fault isolation for the United
States Air Force's equipment and systems.
The Air Force Studies Board will conduct a three week summer study on Fault
'Isolation.
.The Air Force Studies Board is supported by Contract No. ?49620-83-C-0111
with Headquarters, Air Force Systems Command, Andrew? Air Force Base, Maryland.
November 13 1984
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APPENDIX D
Further Deliberationa
Sitatementa by J. W. Schaefer and P. E. Partridge
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a, W. SCILAVVEN
He1,1,W®N^roNlo
W10PPA", N.:. 019L1
ANZA Coos V.01 3R..0900
March 25, 1985
Mr. L. R. Greenwood
Mission Planning b Program
Development Director
Fairchild Space Company
Century 21 Blvd.
Germantown, MD 20874
Dear Ron,
Since our meeting in Huntsville last Wednesday and Thursday,
I have thought more about the suggestions I made on :.maintenance
of the Space Station. In particular, I think that the Remote
Maintenance and Test System concept is important to the success
of the Space Station. In retrospect, I should have done a better
Job in describing the manner in which it could be used to save
crew-time and training as well as provide comprehensive and continual
monitoring of the status of the equipment on-board the Space
Station. My description was certainly too general to adequately•
convey the potential utility of the remote maintenance facility
and the similarity to the one that we provided for the Dimension
PBX. I will summarize my thoughts below.
A computer based terminal on the ground would be used by an expert
maintenance craftsman who would dial-up the "address" of the
equipment he wishes to test. The ground-based computer would
interroga`e the test points of the on-board equipment via a digital
transmissirn link between the ground station and the Space Station.
A programneC sequence of tests would be administered automatically
to verify that the equipment is working properly. The tests
would be des'gned so that, if any step in the sequence fails,
the failure would be isolated on a printout to the smallest replaceable
unit.
The remote maintenance system's capability to perform software
maintenance would be just as important as its ability to test and
diagnose hardware operations. Program "bugs" could be detected
and fixed from the remote keyboard. Software updates and other
program changes would be inserted in the same manner. Of course,
any changes in the program would have been thoroughly checked
out in identical processors on the ground before being transmitted
and inserted in the processor aloft.
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The use of a ground-based remote maintenance system would (1)
reduce the time the crew need spend working on the equipment,
(2) reduce the software and diagnostic training required by the
crew, and (3) provide more comprehensive preventative maintenance
and failure analysis.
Even though there seemed to be general agreement at our meeting
with the attributes of remote maintenance as outlined above,
I believe that the need for early action was not fully appreciated.
The design of the maintenance system affects every circuit board
and sub-assembly. The test points that need to be monitored
must be made accessible at connectors and the transmission system
must be standardized. To accomplish this, maintenance must be
treated as a single system and its design must be started at
least as early as any of the rest of the equipment.
The various design organizations will each have their own priorities
and will tend to worry about maintenance only after their primary
role has been satisfied. From my experience, maintenance systems
cannot be an afterthought or overlay at the end of the design
process.
The organization responsible for the maintenance system design
will need some authority to assure that their requirements are
honored by the rest of project. It is important that they get
started now. It will be uifficult to implement such procedures
in the Space Station project because of the way NASA has it organized.
If there is interest within NASA to pursue this concept further,
I will be happy to arrange for a more complete discussion of
the remote maintenance systems that are used in the telephone
plant.
incere
'Schaefer
AT&T Bell Laboratories
Room 5A-306
190 River Road
Summit, NJ	 07901
CC: Bernard Maggin
National Research Council
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AFTER THOUGHTS ON SPACE STATION MAINTAINABILITY
Peter E. Partp1d8e
	 OPMNAL PAGE MJcdn)s Harkins Universit y
	^^
-^"'POOR^U^[^YApp lied Ph ysics Laboratory ~
A|»,^i]. 10, 1906
If the Sp ace Station is trul y to have an indefinite
life with evolutionar y g rowth then a fundamental aymunntion
in develop in g a viable maintainabilit y Pnilosonhr is 1.`at
eventuallvv at one time or anotAer y every element of the
station will be renlaced due to wearout, failure, or
obeolesence~ Therefure, ever y element must be replaceable
eitner as an individual item or as a Part of a lar9er
re p laceable assembl y . Furthermore, a rationale must be
develop ed tnat determines when and now renlacem pnt will
occur under the constraint of maximum safet y and continuity
of mission oneration y at minimum cost.
The conce p t of minimum cost needs further develmnment
anO definition.	 It 1s difficult to define life cvcle cost
for a sy stem t"at is evolutionary with indefinite life "	For
life c ycle costinG Pur p oses, it may be desireabls to define
the mvstem life as IOC + ten rears, for example.
Based an my own ex*e p ience I wish to stron g l y endorse
the concep t that cost can be minimized b y usi"Wv wherever
Possiblev existin g n pove" ki~rel desi gns that utillre
currentl y
 available standard |`i~ pel Parts addin g redundancy
wnere needed for critical functions. In additionp I
y tro"@1v endorse the use of Failure Mode and Effects
Criticalit y Anal ysis (FMGCA) or a1ternativelv, Fault Tree
Anal ysis, as nowerful desi g n anal ysis tools for
establisnin9 cause and effect relationshi p s and their
nrobabi1ities ° These anal ysis tecUninues should be
extensivel y utilized in the develo p ment of an y new designs
that may be renuired,.
If maintainabilit y is imp ortant to the Sp ace Station,
as it Prop erl y snould be y then it needs to be made a first
level req uirement, be g iven stron g emp hasis and ki8k
visibilitvp and receive to p level manag ement attention and
advocac y . Contractors must be p rovided with a clea,
statement of maintainabilit y objectives and an overview of
the imnortant 1 ysues p concerta and su ggested approaches
associated With maintalnabilitv. The y must be encoura g ed to
use their initiative tn find imag inative and creative
solutions to maintainabilit y nroblene and incentivised on
the basis of how well the y nerForm ag ainst maintainability
objectives. Reviews at all levels must include
maintainability,
 as a sp ecific tonic to be addressed a"d
must jud g e the Prop osed mainta1nabilitY a pp roach on thebasis of its consistenc y
 with overall *roO/`am objective*,
Of ruesible rerinnerial in[ecest to NASA and its
cuntrartnrs ,i1 p re3ard to	 tec»no1u9v is
the 400 Me*ijoJ of the Meunaoicai Faiiurew prevenLiun
^^
*
^^	 ^^
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Group being held on Ap ril 16-IBP 1986 at the National
Bureau of Standards in Gaithe •sbun& Mary land. Thing meeting
is +eaturino a %YmPoSiUM On the Use of New Technolo gy to
Imp rove Mechanical Readinessr Reliabilit y and
Maintainabilit y . The SYMPOMiUM is sp onsored b y the National
Bureau of Standardsp the Office of Naval Research and the
Army Materials and MeChanicm Rezearth Center with
Particip ation b y
 the IEEE Reliabilit y Societ y . A copy of
the s ymposium announcement and Pro g ram Schedule!
technical Prementotionm is enclosed. A review of the
Presentation titles indicates that there may be some
material app licable to Space Station maintainability.
4
7
